| This paper presents an overview of the development of the Hanoi Daewoo
Hotel, beginning with initial feasibility studies and continuing on into
the present. As this is the first 5-star international hotel project for
which a Korean hotel company has been responsible for all aspects of the
project, from construction to management, this overview can provide lessons
for companies undertaking expansion into similar markets. Issues discussed
include partnership arrangements, existing and needed infrastructure, construction,
cultural differences, human resource management, marketing activities,
the market situation in Hanoi, and specific problems encountered by DAEWOO
as it developed this particular hotel.
A HISTORIC MILESTONE
The Korean hotel industry reached a historic milestone on October 20,
1996, with the opening of the Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel in Vietnam. The city known
as the "Pearl of Southeast Asia" played host to 250 guests who arrived
from South Korea via charter flight, and 1,500 politicians, public officials,
businessmen, scholars, members of the press, diplomats, and representatives
of the hotel and tourism industry from Vietnam and around the world. The
French journal l'officiel spotlighted the opening ceremony, and
special reports ran in other Vietnamese and Korean media. The opening of
the Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel is significant because it is the first fully Korean-owned
and operated hotel using a Korean brand name, outside of Korea.
DAEWOO Corporation is one of several major conglomerates (chaebol) in
South Korea. Founded in 1967 as a textile manufacturer, DAEWOO has since
expanded into many different strategic areas including heavy industry,
electric motors, electronics, construction, securities and financial
services, and hospitality.
Approximately two decades ago, DAEWOO was one of the first Korean chaebol
to seek an investment opportunity in the hospitality industry. Under the
aegis of its construction arm, DAEWOO built a luxury hotel in Seoul to
accommodate international travelers, and negotiated a management contract
with Hilton International in 1983 to operate the hotel, located near Namdaemun
in central Seoul. The DAEWOO-Hilton management contract was the second
one in the history of the Korean hotel industry. In 1991, DAEWOO opened
a second hotel under the Hilton flag in Kyongju.
Tourism in the Asia-Pacific area has been growing tremendously since
the Second World War. After Europe and the Americas, this area is the third
largest region in terms of tourism receipts and arrivals worldwide and
is growing, (Arroll, 1993) while Europe and the Americas continue to see
a decline in worldwide tourism market share. DAEWOO Development Co., Ltd.,
DAEWOO Corporation's hospitality business unit, has taken advantage of
this trend by moving into China and Vietnam in the late 1990s. Some analysts
viewed this as a risky move, partially due to a report by Holiday Inn Worldwide
rating China and Vietnam as "less politically stable" areas for investment.
(Go and Heung, 1995.) Another reason was the decision to use the DAEWOO
brand name instead of an already recognized hotel brand, as it had with
Hilton in Seoul and Kyongju.
In 1996, DAEWOO opened the Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel in Vietnam and the Yanbin
DAEWOO Hotel in China. In 1997, DAEWOO acquired the Guilin Sheraton Hotel
in China and renamed it the Guilin DAEWOO Sheraton Hotel. DAEWOO expects
to capitalize on its own brand name by applying 20 years of experience
in the hotel business in Korea to its operations in China and Vietnam.
From there, DAEWOO plans to expand into other international markets.
Table 1 shows Daewoo's current hotel holdings around the world.
-
Hilton International (b,d) Seoul, Korea 1983
-
Kyongju Hilton (b) Kyongju, Korea 1991
-
Beijing Kempinsi Hotel (c)Beijing , China 1992
-
Yanbin DAEWOO Hotel (b) Yanbin, China 1996
-
Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel (b) Hanoi, Vietnam 1996
-
Hotel Palace (a) Khartoum, Sudan 1996
-
Sheraton Sofia (a) Sofia, Bulgaria 1996
-
Guilin DAEWOO Sheraton Hotel (a) Guilin, China 1997
-
Hotel International Alger (a) Alger, Algeria 1997
-
Rabat Hilton (a) Rabat, Morocco 1997
a: existing hotel purchased whole or in part by
DAEWOO
b: hotel built and operated by DAEWOO
c: joint venture with Lufthansa
d: Sold in 1999
VIETNAM? WHY VIETNAM?
Doi moi. American readership will be most familiar with Vietnam
through references to the Vietnam war, just as they are probably most familiar
with Korea through references to the Korean war. So the question, "Why
Vietnam?" is one that must first be answered, given the turbulent past
of this subtropical Asian nation, and its Communist government's anti-capitalist
policies. In 1986, the Vietnamese government announced a perestroika -
like policy known as doi moi (renovation) which encourages foreign
investment and foreign ownership of property, in the interest
of promoting free enterprise. South Korea and Vietnam had broken off diplomatic
relations in 1974, but with the reestablishment of diplomatic ties in 1992,
Korean investment in Vietnam began to accelerate.
Table 2 shows that as of 1996, Korea is one of the largest foreign investors
in Vietnam, following Taiwan, Japan and Hong Kong.
Table 2. Top 12 Investors in Vietnam, 1996
|
Country
|
Number of Projects
|
Investment Capital (US$ million)
|
Share Capital (US$ million)
|
| Taiwan |
248 |
4,038.00 |
1,714.52 |
| Japan |
145 |
2,303.91 |
1,059.61 |
| Hong Kong |
173 |
2,050.06 |
1,042.64 |
| South Korea |
166 |
1,662.32 |
905.01 |
| British Virgin Islands |
54 |
1,473.39 |
591.29 |
| Singapore |
140 |
1,402.53 |
1,025.65 |
| Malaysia |
49 |
1,018.18 |
439.67 |
| USA |
52 |
776.95 |
287.54 |
| Thailand |
66 |
679.91 |
306.20 |
| Australia |
52 |
675.75 |
536.00 |
| Panama |
6 |
666.75 |
206.58 |
| France |
79 |
579.19 |
270.72 |
Source : Travel Trade Gazette TTG Asia.
The Vietnamese government has encouraged DAEWOO to invest in motors,
electronics, cathode-ray tubes (CRTs) and other manufacturing sectors which
developing countries traditionally promote for economic development. The
government also recognizes the significance of tourism and the lodging
industry in particular in Vietnam, and has encouraged DAEWOO to invest
in this area as well.
Table 3. Foreign Investment in Vietnam by Sector, 1996
|
Classification
|
Percent of total
|
| Industry |
37% |
| Hotel, tourism, office building, apartments |
31% |
| Other construction |
9% |
| Transportation, telecommunications, post |
8% |
| Oil industry 5% |
5% |
| Agro-forestry, aqua products |
4% |
Export Processing Zone, International Zone and related
infrastructure |
3% |
| Culture, health, education |
2% |
| Others |
1% |
Source: Travel Trade Gazette(TTG) Asia.
Market opportunity. Nearby markets in Southeast Asia
are already saturated. Hong Kong, Jakarta, Bangkok, Singapore, and many
major Chinese cities have no need for more 5- star or 4-star hotels. In
fact, Hong Kong has recently seen several of its hotel properties converted
to office space due to overbuilding in the luxury hotel market. Developing
countries in the region such as Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar (Burma),
on the other hand, still have room for deluxe hotel development (Watkins,
1994).
International tourist arrivals and receipts in Vietnam have been increasing
steadily since the implementation of doi moi. (See Table 4.) Much of this
increase was in visitors from business and pleasure travelers from foreign
countries outside of COMECON (members of the communist trading block),
who are presumed to prefer luxury hotels when choosing lodging. Vietnam
has a significant dearth of hotels that are capable of providing an international
standard of service quality.
Table 4. International Tourist Arrivals and Tourism Receipts
in Vietnam
|
Year
|
Number of Arrivals (thousands)
|
Change from previous year
|
Receipts (US$ million)
|
Change from previous year
|
| 1990 |
250 |
16.3% |
85 |
44.1% |
| 1991 |
300 |
20.0% |
85 |
0.0% |
| 1992 |
440 |
46.7% |
80 |
-5.9% |
| 1993 |
670 |
52.3% |
85 |
6.3% |
| 1994 |
1,018 |
51.9% |
85 |
0.0% |
| 1995 |
1,250 |
22.8% |
86 |
1.2% |
Source: World Tourism Organization (WTO)
FINDING A LOCAL PARTNER
The Vietnamese government encourages foreign companies to form joint
ventures with local companies when investing in Vietnam. Following the
recommendation of the government, DAEWOO formed a joint venture corporation
with HANEL (Hanoi Electric). The joint venture, is known as DAEHA Co.,
Ltd. (an acronym formed from the names of the two partners). In Southeast
Asia, people prefer not to do business with others with whom they are not
acquainted. They also look for partners with political connections, which
are needed to get things done under the Communist regime, and who have
an established presence in the community, in order to attract financing
(Saunders and Renaghan, 1992). The Vietnamese government recommended HANEL,
which already had a partnership arrangement with the cathode-ray manufacturing
division of DAEWOO Corp., as the partner for the hotel development.
Lenders and investors expect high rates of return from projects in the
Mekong River region. Although they still avoid countries like Myanmar,
Cambodia, and Laos, which are characterized by high political risk and
lack of investment security, they actively
pursue investment opportunities in Vietnam, where growth is tremendous
(Mattila 1997). Total investment in the Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel amounted
to US$165,015,000, comprised of both owner's equity and debt. DAEWOO Corp
(US$47,715,000) and DAEHA (US$69,000,000) provided a total of US$ 116,715,000
in debt from their principal financial institutions. DAEWOO
Corp. also provided US$48,300,000 in owner's
equity. HANEL contributed US$10,116,000 as a 38-year land lease expenditure.
Profits realized through the 23rd year of the partnership will be divided
with 70% going to DAEWOO Corp. and 30% to HANEL. From the 24th through
the 38th year, profits will be divided 60/40 in favor of DAEWOO, and thereafter
the ratio is 45% to DAEWOO, and 55% for HANEL.
DAEHA and DAEWOO Development Co., Ltd. have agreed to a 20-year management
contract, with DAEWOO Development receiving 1.85% of gross revenues and
7% of gross operating profit as its management fee for the first five years
of the contract. After that, the percentage of gross operating profit paid
to DAEWOO Development will increase by 1% every fifth year.
MARKET OUTLOOK
Vietnam is divided into four major tourist regions: Hanoi-Ha Long-Dien
Bien Phu, Hue-Da Nang, Nha Trang-Dalat, and Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon) (Jansen-Verbeke,
Go, and Hom 1995). Hanoi, being a regional capital, was chosen as the best
candidate for the proposed development. Hanoi is a relic of Vietnam's imperial
and colonial past and has rich cultural heritage as well as architectural
distinctiveness.
Transportation.
Hanoi's transportation infrastructure is also sufficiently developed
to support travel and tourism. Hanoi has an international airport. Additional
transport facilities include the Dien Bien Phu domestic aliport, seaports
at Haipong and Quang Ninh, the recently completed Hanoi-Beijing passenger
train, and the rail network connecting Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City in the
south. One weakness in local transportation infrastructure, however, is
the road system. Vietnam's subtropical climate makes road maintenance particularly
difficult. Frequent heavy rains cause continual erosion and therefore the
road network in the northern part of Vietnam is in poor condition. For
example, travel to and from Dien Bien Phu, a distance of approximately
185 miles, can take up to five days by land.
Competition. Previous hotel construction and development has
been concentrated in Vietnam's capital, Ho Chi Minh City. Ho Chi Minh City,
like Hong Kong and Singapore, now has a surplus of luxury hotel rooms,
and so further development there is impractical. However, in Hanoi, most
hotel development has been targeted to the more austere demands of
COMECON tourists, which as mentioned before, are not up to par with
the demands for the new wave of international travelers flocking to Vietnam.
This situation makes Hanoi an ideal candidate for upscale hotel development.
The attractiveness of Hanoi for hotel development has not gone entirely
unnoticed by other companies, of course, and recent years have seen an
increase in the number of 5-star hotels. When the Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel opened
in 1996, there was oniy one 5-star competitor, a Sofitel property backed
by Accor. As of this writing, however, the number of 5-star hotel rooms
in Hanoi has increased to 1,483. Table 5 lists the various 5-star hotel
properties in Hanoi, along with their occupancy rates.
Table 5. Average Room Occupancy in the
Hanoi 5-Star Hotel Market
|
Property
|
Rooms
|
Year Opened
|
Primary Investor
|
Occupancy 1997
|
Occupancy 1998
|
Ocupancy 1999
|
| Sofitel |
244 |
1992 |
France |
45% |
40% |
40% |
| Daewoo |
411 |
1996 |
Korea |
41% |
41% |
40% |
| Horizon |
324 |
1997 |
Indonesia |
27% |
23% |
23% |
| Meritus |
322 |
1998 |
Singapore |
na |
19% |
22% |
| Nikko |
260 |
1998 |
Japan |
na |
31% |
34% |
| Mellia |
308 |
1999 |
Thaniland |
na |
na |
11% |
| Hilton |
269 |
1999 |
Britain |
na |
na |
14% |
Sofitel received its 5-star designation in December,
1996
DAEWOO received its 5-star designation in November, 1997
Other hotels are currently under evaluation.
Financial crisis. In addition to an increased number of competitors,
the Asian financial crisis has made Hanoi an increasingly competitive market.
Beginning in late 1997, the economic crisis hit many major Asian countries,
which are the primary sources for Vietnam's international tourism demand
(see Table 6). Foreign visitor arrivals in 1998 were down 12% from 1997,
but at the same time around
1,500 new hotel rooms were added to the Hanoi market. This combination
of increased supply and sharply decreased demand, has caused the cancellation
of three 5-star hotel projects: the Sheraton (Faber Labuan & Renong,
Malaysia), the Lien West-Lake Resort (Sonnie Lien, Singapore), and the
Great Lake View (Masia Pacific Corp, Thailand).
Table 6. Tourist Arrivals in Vietnam by Selected Country of
Origin
|
Countries
|
1992
|
1993
|
1994
|
1995
|
Percent of Total
|
| Taiwan |
70,143 |
95,077 |
184,241 |
224,004 |
17.9% |
| France |
19,204 |
47,683 |
96,697 |
119,202 |
9.5% |
| Japan |
19,119 |
29,683 |
65,055 |
117,763 |
9.4% |
| USA |
14,563 |
23,361 |
42,438 |
54,368 |
4.3% |
| UK |
6,662 |
17,276 |
36,863 |
51,817 |
4.1% |
| Thailand |
10,557 |
13,869 |
23,581 |
22,943 |
1.8% |
| Hong Kong |
13,985 |
15,224 |
23,186 |
21,093 |
1.7% |
| China |
2,738 |
8,352 |
14,326 |
19,407 |
1.6% |
| Total (including others) |
440,000 |
670,000 |
1,018,000 |
1,250,000 |
100.0% |
Sources: World Tourism Statistics, Outbound Statistics
by Destination,
Asia-Pacific Exchange Centre (APTTE)/ WTO
GETTING STARTED: INITIAL
HURDLES
Operating in a foreign country presents certain obstacles that are not
usually encountered in one's own domestic market. Companies operating outside
their own country find that they often have little or no influence over
the host state (Dallas 1995). In determining the attractiveness of this
development, DAEWOO had to take into consideration the fact that despite
doi moi, the Vietnamese government is still communist, and authoritarian,
and would no doubt present certain obstacles that DAEWOO had not encountered
elsewhere.
Taxes and profit repatriation. Since it encourages foreign
investment, Vietnam was also expected to have an established mechanism
for profit repatriation and currency conversion, as well as be fairly lenient
with respect to taxes on repatriated profits, and corporate taxes in general.
Vietnam actually imposes only a 5% tax on profit repatriation, with no
other specific restrictions. Profits may be converted to a hard currency
as approved by Vietnam's central bank. The uncertain availability of hard
currency in Vietnam has served to delay profit repatriation, but so far
no other major problems have arisen. The tax situation is also quite favorable.
For the first two years of operation, the hotel pays no corporate tax on
profits. During the third and fourth year, the hotel's profits are taxed
at half the standard rate (for example, if the stated tax rate is 30% during
those two years, the hotel pays at a rate of 15%). After the fourth year,
profits are taxed at only one-fifth the stated tax rate (a tax rate of
30% would mean a tax liability for the hotel of only 6%).
Customs duties. Vietnam has also been generous with its levying
of customs duties. A hotel operation of this nature, in order to maintain
service quality, requires a large amount of supplies to be imported from
overseas as they are unavailable in Vietnam. Low tariff rates, ranging
from 0% to 5%, were levied for most operating supplies. Consumables,
such as cleaning materials, and artwork used to provide a native atmosphere,
such as ceramics and bamboo wares, are all supplied from within Vietnam.
A host of general hotel supplies, however, must be imported from overseas.
Electronics, bed sheets, duvets, towels, kitchen equipment, tablecloths,
service trolleys, uniforms, office supplies, and the like were imported
from Korea. Other food and beverage equipment, fitness equipment, palm
trees, carpeting, and furniture were all imported from other countries.
Operating licenses and permits. Although the government policies
towards the financial aspects of the project were fairly helpful, in other
areas, DAEWOO found that local government officials could be rather recalcitrant.
Local authorities must sign off on various aspects of the construction,
such as elevator or lift approvals, electrical and fire code compliance;
they must also provide operating permits such as liquor licenses and health
inspection certificates. DAEWOO ran into trouble when applying for a pile-driving
license, which is required under Vietnam's building and construction laws.
DAEWOO simultaneously sent invitations to the pile driving ceremony
to VIPs in Vietnam and Korea when it submitted an application for the pile-driving
license. The ceremony was scheduled for April 26, 1994. However, proverbial
red tape, and the foot-dragging of local bureaucrats threatened to delay
the ceremony. DAEWOO had made great efforts to receive approval to start
driving piles by the specified date, but local officials could offer no
assurance as to when the license would be issued. The day before the ceremony
was to be held, everything was ready, except for the license. DAEWOO officials
were getting desperate as it looked like the ceremony would have to be
cancelled and the start of construction delayed. The license was finally
received at 4:00 p.m. on the afternoon of April 25th, and the ceremony
was held on the 26th, only two days behind schedule.
Lease term. Most companies accustomed to dealing in a capitalist
environment expect to be able to purchase the land that their development
stands on. Often this is a better investment than a lease for the same
property would be. In Vietnam, however, all real estate belongs to the
government, and so there is no option to buy. The cost of the land-lease
for the Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel was comparatively high, but that can be accounted
for by Hanoi's well-developed infrastructure. DAEWOO encountered a problem,
though, in that while the Vietnamese government will allow leasing for
"stable and long-term use," it usually will not specify the duration of
such use. This quite understandably makes the developer quite uneasy. DAEWOO
was fortunate to have a specific lease term of 38 years agreed to by the
government.
Wages and unionization. The labor-intensive nature of the hospitality
industry requires that employment issues be considered when developing
a new property. Vietnam's minimum wage at the time was US$45 per month,
and so DAEWOO determined that it could set its average wage between US$50
and US$80 per month. The abundance of inexpensive labor is a positive aspect
of doing business in Vietnam. The Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel employed some 580
locals, 10 Koreans, and 19 foreigners when it opened. For every silver
lining there is a cloud, though, and the cloud in Vietnam is the mandatory
establishment of a labor union. By law, hotel employees had to be unionized
within 6 months after the start of operations, so a labor union was organized
in 1997. Although the existence of the union is mandatory, membership is
optional. Even so, about 90% of employees have joined the union, including
vice-presidents and directors of hotel operating departments.
DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
Each culture has its own unique sense of aesthetics, and Vietnam is
no exception. How a hotel "should" look can be a very sensitive issue to
local residents, but on the other hand the projected customer mix must
be also considered when designing the hotel (Bell 1986). The Hanoi DAEWOO
Hotel was designed with business travelers in mind, complete with the facilities
necessary to doing business. It also has a tropical/French colonial flair
to appeal to both business and pleasure travelers, as well as local residents.
| Five companies participated in the design of
the Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel. RTKL (US) completed the basic construction design.
Seoul Architect Ltd. (Korea) handled practical application design. Paul
Leese Roberson Freeman Designers Ltd. (Hong Kong) designed the interior
spaces. Lighting design was the work of Light Direction Ltd. (Hong Kong).
Waters Kinura Motoda, Inc. (US) landscaped the hotel grounds.
Construction of the Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel took place between April 1994
and October |
Hanoi Daewoo Hotel
360 Kim Ma
Ba Dinh Dist.,
Hanoi
|
|
1996. Most international construction projects finish behind schedule,
due to delays in obtaining materials, bureaucratic stonewalling, and other
delays caused by the complex nature of the project. The Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel
was an exception, however, with construction completed six months ahead
of schedule. Part of the credit goes to the prior experience of DAEWOO
Development and DAEWOO Construction (the official contractor) who had built
Daewoo's joint-venture CRT factory in Vietnam. That experience had given
DAEWOO Construction the necessary expertise to anticipate problems, provide
solution, and prevent mistakes in the construction process. One innovation
DAEWOO introduced was the selection of local construction companies based
on their ability, availability of equipment, and amount of skilled manpower.
Although a competitive selection process is unfamiliar to the Vietnamese,
this approach enabled DAEWOO to reduce construction time while maintaining
high quality standards, because they had selected the best contractors
for the job.
The construction of the hotel was not completely problem-free,
of course. Supplies of local construction materials were inconsistent.
Basic materials such as cement, sand, pebble, and bricks were supplied
from within Vietnam. These products actually proved to be more difficult
to acquire at certain points during the construction than did the reinforcing
rods, electric wiring, and finishing materials like tile, wallpaper, and
paint which were imported from Korea. Other countries supplied various
other materials: marble and curtain walls came from Italy, and other interior
finishing materials were imported from Hong Kong. All foreign suppliers
were selected on the basis of competitive prices, quality, delivery date,
and overall customer confidence regardless of their country of origin.
Despite efforts to select the best local subcontractors,
DAEWOO still found the lack of skilled manpower and equipment to be problems
during Construction. Vietnamese workmen have little or no experience in
using modern finishing materials, and so the Korean foremen had to spend
a great deal of time in training and supervision. Language problems and
misunderstandings led to arguments and delays. Needed construction
equipment often had to be imported, increasing construction costs, because
it was unavailable for lease in Vietnam. Minor thefts also became a problem
during the construction. Foreign development projects
are prime targets for theft in Vietnam's undeveloped economy, and the hotel
construction was no exception. Furthermore, thefts increased as construction
progressed because of the unwillingness of the local Vietnamese police
to prosecute Vietnamese locals for theft.
THE FINISHED PRODUCT
The Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel accommodates international guests visiting Hanoi
and has hosted official events such as the Francophone Summit in 1997 and
the ASEAN Summit in 1998. The finished hotel stands 18 stories high and
serves as a symbol for doi moi - renovation - in a very literal sense.
Hanoi, heavily bombed during the Vietnam War, had no buildings higher than
10 stories high at the time the hotel was completed. French Colonial and
tropical design influences are evident in the classic balustrades on the
balconies and the local tiles used on the first floor and roof of the hotel.
The hotel also reminds the guest of an art gallery, as some 1,000 works
of art valued at over US $1 million are on display, including an unparalleled
collection of original Vietnamese paintings.
The hotel has 411 guestrooms including 33 suites. All rooms are furnished
with an international direct dial telephone, central air-conditioning and
heating with individual climate controls, a private bath with tub and shower,
refrigerator with minibar, a radio/music system, satellite television (CNN,
BBC, STAR-TV and NHK Sports), and in-room safe. The hotel has a diverse
selection of restaurants featuring Japanese (Edo), Chinese (Silk Road),
and French (La Paix) cuisine prepared by some of the world's best chefs.
Cafe Promenade, a European buffet restaurant, offers a selection of food
from various countries for breakfast, lunch and dinner. The focal point
of the hotel is its elegant lobby. Guests enjoy captivating views of the
hotel gardens through 40-foot high floor-to-ceiling windows. Sunlight
cascades through the windows, illuminating the original artworks and distinct
furnishings that are placed throughout the hotel. At night, guests are
enthralled by the panoramic view of Hanoi and Thu Le Lake from the sky
lounge, Lake View, on the 18th floor.
Convention and banquet facilities provide the ideal venue for various
kinds of functions. With 13 rooms to choose from, seating can be provided
for parties ranging in size from 10 to 1,000. A complete selection
of audio-visual equipment and simultaneous translation
services in up to six languages is available. The business center, a complete
office-away-from-the-office, provides business travelers with the support
they need to get the job done. Spacious, bright, and comfortable, this
modern facility boasts private workstations, a library, meeting rooms,
presentation facilities, translation services, and complete secretarial
support. The latest recreational facilities and equipment are also available,
including saunas, Jacuzzis, a sun terrace, gym, aerobics room, massage,
outdoor swimming pool, an entertainment club, and a large indoor golf driving
range with putting greens.
CULTURAL CONFLICTS
Although both Korea and Vietnam are Asian societies, with common cultural
ties in Buddhism and Confucianism, the development of the Hanoi DAEWOO
Hotel has proven to be an interesting study in Korean/Vietnamese cultural
differences. Generally speaking, the Vietnamese are not accustomed
to accomplishing more than two assignments at the same time. They are very
conscious of superstition and must choose an auspicious day for starting
and ending work. They also prefer a more relaxed pace than do Koreans.
These customs have caused problems for the Korean project managers, especially
when work needs to be completed with some urgency.
One episode in particular illustrates the cultural differences encountered.
Prior to the grand opening of the hotel in April 1996, several shipping
containers of operating supplies had been rushed into Hanoi. The shipment
had to undergo inspection by customs officers, of course. Among the shipment
were two containers containing 100 beds (mattress and base). The customs
officer, counting 200 individual pieces, insisted that there was a discrepancy
between the bill of lading and the actual number of beds, and would not
sign off on the shipment. Unaccustomed to Western-style beds, the customs
officer could not make a distinction between the mattress and base, and
remained unconvinced that one bed consists of two parts. Hotel officials
assembled a bed as illustrated in the supplier's catalog, to demonstrate
how the beds were to be put together, but this still did not convince the
customs official. Finally, one of the Korean employees invited the customs
officer to his home to see the bed he uses. It took two days to convince
him that there were indeed 100 beds, and
to have the shipment approved.
MARKETING THE HOTEL
DAEWOO Corporation is already recognized worldwide as a manufacturer
of motors and electronics. However, it is not yet a household word with
respect to its lodging operations. The Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel has made focus
on market share and building brand recognition its primary marketing activities.
Target markets. Table 7 details the market segments targeted
by the Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel. The segment that makes up most of the hotel's
occupancy is frequent individual travelers (FITs) and corporate travelers.
Following the FITs are pleasure travelers, who make reservations via local
and overseas travel agents. The hotel's third major market is government
and diplomatic officials. In light of its position as an independent hotel,
DAEWOO has sought to increase market penetration by joining reservation
service groups such as UTELL International and Leading Hotels of the World.
These channels have yet to prove particularly beneficial, however.
Table 7. Market Segments and Share of Occupancy of Hanoi Daewoo
Hotel
|
Market Segment
|
1996
|
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
Average
|
| FIT / Corporate |
62.1% |
61.54% |
48.74% |
46.03% |
54.60% |
| Government / Diplomatic |
10.2% |
8.10% |
15.54% |
14.37% |
12.05% |
| Utell / Leanding Hotels of the World |
3.16% |
3.14% |
3.24% |
3.18% |
3.18% |
| Convention / Congress |
1.48% |
4.32% |
3.74% |
5.78% |
3.83% |
| Travel Industry |
13.8% |
18.09% |
17.84% |
20.60% |
17.58% |
| Airline Crew |
0.0% |
1.47% |
2.75% |
0.62% |
1.21% |
| Others |
9.26% |
3.34% |
8.15% |
9.42% |
7.54% |
| Total |
100.0% |
100.0% |
100.0% |
100.0% |
100.0% |
Room rates / occupancy / products. The Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel
calculates room rates using the $1 per $1,000 approach. With this approach,
each $1,000 of building cost requires a corresponding $1 of room rate be
charged in order to achieve the desired ROI. However, this strategy is
not entirely practical in Hanoi's 5-star hotel market, as most hotels in
this category in Hanoi use a low-price strategy. The Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel
uses strictly limited discounts in order to maintain service quality; nevertheless,
from 1996 to 1999 the average room rate has declined from US$120 to US$80.
In order to reverse this trend somewhat, the Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel has developed
some new products aimed at increasing the occupancy rate. A personalized
service program for Japanese guests, the "DAEWOO Rewards Club"' for business
travelers, the "Discover Vietnam/Best Hotels Alliance" program for travel
agents and airlines, the "Weekend Delight Package" aimed at Hanoi residents,
and the "Long Staying Guest Package" program for extended-stay guests are
among these new offerings. Due to these new products and other efforts
to increase the occupancy rate, the hotel has enjoyed an average occupancy
rate of around 40% in 1997, 1998 and 1999. This may seem low compared with
the average occupancy rate of hotels located in well-developed markets,
but it is actually the highest among Hanoi 5-star hotels (see Table 5).
The Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel has also developed products to increase food
and beverage sales. A Vietnamese wedding package and the "Club Q: Vietnamese
Lunch Buffet" in the hotel's nightclub have been introduced to appeal to
Hanoi's middle class.
Advertising. Advertising efforts include the use of magazines,
newspapers, and other periodicals, and television commercials to promote
the hotel in overseas markets. Hotel advertisements appear quarterly or
biannually in trade magazines such as Hotel and Travel Index International,
Hotel & Travel USA, World Hotel Index Japan, and OFMG International.
Advertisements appear in overseas magazines relating specifically to business
in Vietnam, such as the Vietnam Business Journal, twice each year. CNBC
through an arrangement with ABN TV carries ads for the hotel as well. Local
advertising efforts include magazines (Heritage), newspapers (Vietnam News
and Laodong), billboards along the Thang Long highway, and a kiosk in the
airport arrival lounge.
STAFFING THE HOTEL
The lack of 5-star hotels in Hanoi, except for the Sofitel, was a mixed
blessing for the Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel. Lack of competition for guests meant
a good customer market opportunity, but at the same time the lack of competing
hotels also meant a nearly nonexistent pool of experienced employees. The
labor market in Hanoi was simply not equipped to supply employees qualified
to work in an international 5-star hotel. In particular, high skilled managers
are in short supply. The Omni Saigon Hotel experienced similar difficulties
in staffing the hotel. Only three months prior to opening, the chain found
it necessary to assemble a task force of 30 employees from its Hong Kong
and Singapore properties to hire and train staff (Khan 1996).
Recruitment. In Vietnam, official job pools must be inspected
for qualified and available employees before a position can be advertised
as available. Hotels, however, are allowed to recruit employees from a
free labor market (Hobson, Heung and Chon 1994). The Hanoi
DAEWOO Hotel maintains relationships with educational institutions
which provide education in hotel or tourism management, such as Hanoi National,
Hanoi Economic, Dong Do, Trade, Hanoi Open University, and Hanoi Tourism
College. These relationships enable the hotel to attract educated, service-oriented
employees. (Hotel employees are fairly well educated: 19% hold university
degrees, 37% a degree from a technical school, and an additional 44% have
a high school diploma.) Finding employees to staff skilled and technical
positions, such as chefs and engineering, continues to remain a challenge.
Training. Besides relying on local educational institutions to
educate its prospective employees, the Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel executes its
own training programs. Approximately 260 Vietnamese employees have
traveled to Seoul for training programs at the Seoul Hilton International.
Initial training programs began on October 5, 1995, well before the grand
opening. Since the pre-opening training programs, there have been 5 additional
training sessions, varying in length from 4 months to 1 year. These programs
are train-the-trainer programs, and participants are expected to return
to Vietnam and pass their knowledge on to coworkers and subordinates. Skills
and topics covered include a general orientation, first aid, manners and
courtesy, supervisory skills, customer satisfaction, and team building.
Turnover. Although most employees are quite proud to work for
the Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel, turnover has increased from 1997 to 1999, in particularly
at the director level (see Table 9). Turnover has increased following the
entrance of competing hotels into the Hanoi labor market. New entrants
to the market have employed the usual tactic of poaching employees from
established properties by offering better salaries and benefits. This is
not uncommon in situations where trained and service-oriented employees
are rare. A similar example of this phenomenon is the Warsaw Marriott,
the first 5-star international hotel in Warsaw, Poland, which became a
recruiting ground for other hotels (Kotchen 1994).
Table 9. Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel Turnover Rates
|
Level
|
1996
|
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
| Director |
0% |
0% |
20% |
30% |
| Supervisors / managers |
2.7% |
13.1% |
10.7% |
2.4% |
| Employee |
3.3% |
12% |
12% |
4.8% |
Turnover rate calculation: Number of employees voluntarily
leaving (annually) + number of persons
employed annually x 100
CONCLUSION
Building a large-scale, international 5-star hotel in an untested market
is a risky venture. The Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel succeeded in Hanoi due to a
combination of entrepreneurial spirit and prior construction experience
in Vietnam, and several existing local conditions: market demand, qualified
local business partners, and perhaps most important, a supportive financial
climate.
Sailing into untested waters with an established brand name is risky
enough: DAEWOO gambled that 20 years experience in the hotel industry with
Hilton would provide the necessary expertise to guarantee success in Hanoi.
It remains to be seen whether the decision to fly the new flag should be
considered a risk, or an opportunity to grow, especially in what has become
a fiercely competitive market for both guest and employees.
To be sure, hurdles remain. DAEWOO must continue its marketing efforts
to establish brand recognition and increase market share. Continue efforts
must be made to educate employees in order to reduce culture clashes. A
major ongoing challenge will be in human resources: recruitment and retention
of skilled employees, as well as ongoing training in order to ensure a
consistently high level of service quality. Given its current position
as leader in the Hanoi market, and the valuable lessons learned, we feel
that the Hanoi DAEWOO Hotel has been a successful first attempt at expanding
into other markets as a truly international hotel chain.
REFERENCES
Arroll, J. (1993). Reports: Tourism Cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific Region. Tourism Management. October, Vol.14, No.5, pp.390-392.
Bell, C. (1986). Crosscultural
Construction: Designing Hotels Overseas. The Cornell Hotel, Restaurant
Administration Quarterly. August, Vol. 27, No.2, pp.25-28.
Dallas, M. (1995). Legal and
Non-Legal Infrastructures Supportihg Tourism Investment in Selected Former
Eastern Bloc Countries. Hospitality Research Journal. Vol.19, No.3, pp.65-81.
Go, F., and Heung, V. (1995). Viewpoint: Harnessing Environment
Analysis to Expand in Asia Pacific. International Journal of Contemporary
Hospitality Management. Vol.7, No.7 pp. i -iv.
Hobson, J., Heung, V., and Chon, K. (1994). Vietnam's
Tourism Industry: Can it Be Kept Afloat? The Cornell Hotel, Restaurant
Administration Quarterly. October, Vol.35, No.5, pp.42-49.
Jansen-Verbeke, M., Go, F., and Hom, H. (1995). Reports:
Tourism Development in Vietnam. Tourism Managment. June, Vol.16, No.4,
pp.315-321.
Khan, M. (1996). Starting Over. lodging Hospitality. February,
Vol.52, No.2, pp.28-30.
Kotchen, D. (1994). The Warsaw Marriott: New Comtpetition
for Warsaw's Marriott Hotel. Boston: Harvard Business School, Case number
S-693-024.
Mattila, A. (1997). Investment Returns and Opportunities
for Hotels in Asia. The Cornell Hotel, Restaurant Administration Quarterly.
February, Vol. 38, No.1, pp.72-78.
Saunders, H. and Renaghan, L. (1992). Southeast Asia:
A New Model for Hotel Development. The Cornell Hotel, Restaurant Administration
Quarterly. October, Vol.33, No.5, pp.16-23.
Watkins, E. (1994). Aiming at Asia. Lodging Hospitality.
October, Vol.50, No.10, pp.28-30
|